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F.C.C. and the Fairness Doctrine
Marilyn G. Zack*
M OST PEOPLE ARE FAMILIAR with the law requiring radio and tele-
vision stations to offer equal time to opposing candidates at elec-
tion time. However, the legal obligation imposed upon broadcasters to
present contrasting, responsible points of view on controversial issues of
puhlin impo-ance-the faircss %doctrine-is it'Le known, despite the
recent controversy over the fairness of the news media which began with
Vice President Spiro T. Agnew's speeches of November, 1969. In Red
Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C.2 the Supreme Court upheld the
fairness doctrine and the rules promulgated under it-rules relating to
editorializing about candidates for public office and to personal attacks
made during the presentation of views on controversial issues of public
importance. Mr. Justice White wrote: "The Federal Communications
Commission has for many years imposed on radio and television broad-
casters the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on
broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair
coverage." 3 Yet, in the opinion of Vice President Agnew, ". . . a broader
spectrum of national opinion should be represented among commentators
of the network news. Men who can articulate other points of view should
be brought forward." 4
Red Lion has been hailed as a landmark case, both by broadcasters
and by proponents of the view that the first amendment should be orient-
ed toward the listener rather than the speaker. The broadcasters claim
that in its decision against them, the Supreme Court "embarked on a
broad exhortation before which would seem to fall almost any limitation
on program regulation." 5 The winners claim that the emphasis on the
public's right to hear has created a concomitant right of access to the
broadcasting media."
The essential facts of Red Lion were that in November, 1964, station
WGCB, licensed to the Red Lion Broadcasting Company, carried a 15
minute program by Rev. Billy James Hargis. He discussed a book by
Fred J. Cook entitled Goldwater-Extremist on the Right and alleged,
*B.S., Purdue University; M.B.A., University of Michigan; Third-year student at
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1 Report of the Commission in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,
13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) (Hereinafter cited as Editorializing Report).
2 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3 Id. at 369.
4 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 21, 1969, at 12-A.
5 Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's New
Clothes, 23 Fed. Com. B. J. 75, at 76 (1969).
6 Note, Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC-Extension of the Fairness Doctrine
to Include Right of Access to the Press, 15 S.D.L.Rev. 172 at 179 (1970).
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among other things, that Cook had been fired by a newspaper for fabri-
cating charges against public officials and that Cook had worked for a
Communist-affiliated publication. Hearing of the broadcast, Cook de-
manded free time to reply, but WGCB refused. Cook protested to the
F.C.C., which ruled that the broadcast constituted a personal attack and
that the station had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness doc-
trine.7 In 1962 the Commission had ruled that licensees have a duty to
offer reply time to persons whose character is impugned on the air.8 In
Times-Mirror the F.C.C. spelled out the duty of licensees to send a tran-
script of any personal attack to the person or group impugned.9 Inter-
estingly, this latter ruling originated in the 1962 California gubernatorial
campaign. As stated in the F.C.C.'s Fairness Primer, "The continuous,
repetitive opportunity afforded for the expression of the commentators'
viewpoints on the gubernatorial campaign, in contrast to the minimal
opportunity afforded to opposing viewpoints, violated the right of the
public to a fair presentation of views." 10 The candidate "unfairly" treat-
ed in this instance was Governor Pat Brown. (His opponent was Richard
M. Nixon.)
WGCB appealed the free reply time ruling to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, which affirmed the F.C.C.'s order,
declaring it constitutional and within the F.C.C.'s statutory authority.1
The station sought Supreme Court review.
Meanwhile, the F.C.C. issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making to
provide procedures in the event of certain personal attacks and station
editorials on political candidates. 12 As stated in its July 5, 1967, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, when the rules were adopted:
The purpose of embodying the procedural aspects of the Commis-
sion's long-adhered-to personal attack principle and political editorial
policy in its Rules is twofold. It will clarify and make more precise
the obligations of broadcast licensees where they have aired personal
attacks and editorials regarding political candidates.... These rules
will serve to effectuate important aspects of the well established Fair-
ness Doctrine; they do not alter or add to the substance of the Doc-
trine.1
The Radio Television News Directors Association appealed the Com-
mission's action to the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit. This
7 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., supra n. 2 at 372.
8 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10420 (1964). (Hereinafter cited as the Fair-
ness Primer.)
9 Id. at 10421.
1o Id.
11 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 381 F. 2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967).
12 31 Fed. Reg. 5710 (1966).
13 32 Fed. Reg. 10303 (1967).
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court set aside the F.C.C.'s order and held that "the rules here chal-
lenged collide with the free speech and free press guarantees contained
in the first amendment." 14 It should be noted, however, that the Court
also said, ". . . we are not prepared to hold that the Fairness Doctrine is
unconstitutional." 15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to both Red
Lion and R.T.N.D.A.
In the United States broadcasting is a competitive business. But
radio and television also are media for the expression of free speech in
matters of vital concern in a self-governing society. Freedom of speech
is protected from governmental abridgement by the first amendment. Is
free speech unconstitutionally abridged by governmental action with re-
spect to program content? Or do the fairness doctrine and the personal
attack and editorialization rules enhance free speech? What quantum
of program control can be justified on the basis of the public interest in
view of the first amendment-which applies also to broadcasters?
How to reconcile the first amendment with the needs of all members
of a democratic society to have exposure to the full range of opinion on
matters of public importance has long concerned legal scholars. The
conflicting lower court decisions in Red Lion and R.T.N.D.A. are evidence
that scholars have not agreed.
The first Congressional enactment pertaining to radio was passed in
1912 when the Radio Act gave the Secretary of Commerce power to issue
licenses and regulate frequencies and hours of operation. 6 But when
Secretary Hoover tried to penalize the Zenith Radio Corporation for op-
erating on an unauthorized frequency, the court held that the Act did not
permit enforcement.' 7 Recognizing that "the medium would be of little
use because of the cacaphony of competing voices, none of which could
be clearly and predictably heard" and "that scientific development at that
time was a limitation upon the number of broadcasting stations," 18 Con-
gress passed the Radio Act of 1927, establishing the Federal Radio Com-
mission to allocate frequencies among competing applicants.19 This Act
was superseded by the Communications Act of 1934, and in 1938, when
television was incipient, the administrative agency was renamed the
Federal Communications Commission.20 Both these Acts provided for
the licensing and regulating of broadcasters in the "public convenience,
interest and necessity," 21 denied any ownership right to licensed fre-
14 Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. U.S., 400 F. 2d 1002, 1021 (7th Cir. 1968).
15 Id. at 1018.
16 Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
17 U. S. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. 2d 614 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1926).
18 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., supra n. 2 at 376.
19 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
20 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1964).
21 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1970
19 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
quency users,22 and provided that candidates for public office should have
equal opportunities to use broadcast facilities for political purposes. 23
Unlike the equal opportunities doctrine, the fairness doctrine was not
specifically enacted.
In 1949, the F.C.C. issued its Editorializing Report in an attempt to
elucidate "the Commission's position with respect to the obligations of
broadcast licensees in the field of broadcasts of news, commentary and
opinion." 24 It should be noted that since the 1941 FCC ruling in May-
flower Broadcasting Corp.,25 broadcasters had refrained from editorial-
izing. The Commission's statement that ". . . the broadcaster cannot be
an advocate" had been accepted as banning editorializing.26 The Edi-
torializing Report stated:
It is axiomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass commu-
nications in a democracy is the development of an informed public
opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas concern-
ing the vital public issues of the day.... It is this right of the public
to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the government,
any broadcast licensees or any individual member of the public to
broadcast his own particular views on any matter, which is the
foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting.27
Accordingly, the Report obligated licensees to operate in the public
interest by 1) devoting reasonable time to the discussion of controversial
issues of public importance and 2) being fair in the presentation of these
issues.28 It also laid to rest the misconception regarding station edito-
rializing: "... . we have . . . come to the conclusion that overt licensee
editorialization, within reasonable limits and subject to the general re-
quirements of fairness... is not contrary to the public interest." 29
The F.C.C. further declared its intention to apply a "standard of
reasonableness," "one of the basic standards of conduct in numerous
fields of Anglo-American law" 30 when fairness questions came before it.
Noting that some of the witnesses to the public hearings held prior to the
adoption of the Report had raised the issue of the constitutionality of the
Commission's fairness standard as an abridgement of the broadcasters'
right of free speech, the Commission replied:
The freedom of speech protected against governmental abridgement
by the First Amendment does not extend any privilege to govern-
22 47 U.S.C. § 309(h) (1) (1964).
23 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964).
24 Supra n. 1 at 1246.
25 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941).
26 Id. at 340.
27 Supra n. 1 at 1249.
28 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., supra n. 2 at 377.
29 Supra n. 1 at 1249.
80 Id. at 10424.
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ment licensees of means of public communications to exclude the
expression of opinions and ideas with which they are in disagree-
ment.3'
The Commission used the Supreme Court's words in the Associated Press
monopoly case as its justification:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for free-
dom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment
should be read as a command that the government was without,Jvw, proe 4tL-_ Z  - MLi- A__... ___.___^ v
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public, that a free press is a condition of free society. Surely
a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow
of ideas does not afford nongovernmental combinations a refuge if
they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed free-
dom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some.
Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom
to combine to keep others from publishing is not.
32
Political Editorial Rule
The political editorial rule upheld under the fairness doctrine in
Red Lion imposes on a licensee who endorses or opposes a legally quali-
fied candidate the duty to send to other candidates for the same office:
(1) notification of the date and the time of the editorial;
(2) a script or tape of the editorial; and
(3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokes-
man of the candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities.
33
31 Id.
32 Associated Press v. U. S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
33 47 C.F.R. § 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (all identical) (1970). Personal attacks;
political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal
qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable
time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or
group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast;
(2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of
the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the li-
censee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable (1) to
attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal attacks which
are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those
associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized
spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (3) to
bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing pro-
grams, but the provisions of paragraph (a) shall be applicable to editorials of the
licensee).
NOTE: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming within (b)(3),
above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable in the general area of
political broadcasts (b) (2), above. See Section 315 (a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. Sect.
(Continued on next page)
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1970
19 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
The effect of this is to apply to editorials supporting or opposing candi-
dates the statutory rule long prescribed under Sec. 315 (a) of the Com-
munications Act (the equal opportunities doctrine). Under Sec. 315 (a),
however, the offer of time must be to the candidate himself.3 4 In its
Memorandum Opinion and Order adopting the codification of this rule,
the F.C.C. stated that "the standard of fairness ... dictates that where
a licensee editorializes for or against a candidate the appropriate spokes-
man for the conflicting point of view is the opposed candidate's repre-
sentative, or, if the licensee so chooses, the candidate himself.3 5 No
licensee, of course, is required to editorialize and thus trigger this right
of reply. The rule does not, as its name would imply to political scien-
tists, pertain to editorials on issues.
This rule has not engendered much critical comment, either from
legal commentators or broadcasters. Only a handful of stations edito-
rially supported or opposed political candidates before or after the Red
Lion case. For example, Storer Broadcasting Company, in encouraging
its stations to editorialize in 1959, adopted the general principle that edi-
torials should not support or oppose candidates for elective office. 6 As
Jaffe points out, television in particular has changed political campaign-
ing, and its impact on the electorate is significant. "If the contestants are
to have the relatively equal opportunity to reach the public, which our
political system assumes, they must have an equal opportunity to procure
time on television." 37 The rule is "adapted to mitigating broadcasting
onesidedness in the context of a political campaign." 38 At election time,
the public interest in equal access to the airwaves is most critical to the
process of self-government. Editorializing in support of candidates is, as
(Continued from preceding page)
315(a); Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance. 29 Fed. Reg. 10415. The categories listed
in (b) (3) are the same as those specified in Section 315 (a) of the Act.
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the
editorial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates
for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification of
the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; and(3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the
candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities: Provided, however, That where
such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the
licensee shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph sufficiently far in advance
of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to prepare a response and to present it in a timely fashion.
34 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964).
35 32 Fed. Reg. 10303 at para. 4 (1967).
36 Letter from John E. McCoy, Storer Broadcasting Company, April 29, 1970.
37 Jaffe, The Fairness Doctrine, Equal Time, Reply to Personal Attacks, and the
Local Service Obligation: Implications of Technological Change, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev.
550, 551 (1968).
38 Note, Freedom of Speech and Association, F.C.C. Editorializing and Personal
Attack Rules, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 133, 145 (1969).
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a practical matter, granting free time to one candidate, and the F.C.C.
rule simply grants the same free time to the opposition.
Editorializing in opposition to a political candidate, however, also
triggers the reply time obligations. The likely impact on the unopposed
candidate has been uniformly overlooked by those commenting on the
rule. While the station-opposed candidate has been on the air twice, no
broadcast time accrues to his opponent. The effect of such publicity,
even though in part bad publicity, does serve to raise the level of public
awareness of a candidate's name. Candidates for the many minor elective
offices, where public awareness of candidates is low, can be helped in
their campaigns by such exposure, particularly if the public thinks the
station editorial unfair. In some circumstances, it is conceivable that the
rule's benefit would accrue to the opposed candidate and detriment to
the unopposed candidate because the latter's name is mentioned neither
in the editorial nor in the reply. Applied to those election situations in
which any publicity is better than none, the editorialization rule exhibits
political naivete and may be unfair to the unpublicized candidate.
Personal Attack Rule
The personal attack rule, codified from the F.C.C.'s Times-Mirror de-
cision, fixes an absolute duty to offer an opportunity to reply to the per-
son attacked in the discussion of controversial issues.39 It is not limited
to political candidates. Compared to the general fairness doctrine, its
application is relatively simple and definite since it requires that the right
of reply be given only to the one personally attacked. The personal
attack rule is designed to provide the public with both sides of a contro-
versial issue in circumstances when the character, honesty or integrity
of an individual or identifiable group have become part of the issue.40
Private attacks, therefore, are not included by the rule, since there is
no public interest involved. The rule does not apply to bona fide news-
cast, on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event, bona fide news
interviews, and news commentary or analysis contained in these types
of programs. Although not specified in the regulations, the licensee may
stipulate that the reply to a personal attack on a candidate by a person
other than the opposing candidate or members of his team must be given
by a spokesman of the candidate. Otherwise the equal-time cycle of Sec.
315 (a) would come into play.41
Robinson and Barrow agree that the personal attack rule probably
will not significantly inhibit broadcasters from preventing controversial
issues, primarily because of the narrowness of its scope. 42 Further, as
39 47 C.F.R. § 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1970). (See note 33.)
40 32 Fed. Reg. 10303 at para. 9 (1967).
41 Id. at para. 16.
42 Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars
in the Forum of Democracy, 447 U. Cin. L. Rev. 447, 461 (1968).
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Robinson pointed out, justification and constitutional sanction might have
been found "in a long tradition of remedying defamation, antedating the
first amendment." 43 Blake agrees that the Court could have upheld the
personal attack regulations "as a special tort remedy justified because of
the inadequacy of monetary damages." 44 Nevertheless, it is the right of
the public to be informed when a personal attack has obscured the mer-
its of an issue and not the reputation of the attacked person or group
which provides the rule's rationale.
In criticizing the rule, Jaffe points out that radio and television are
part of a complex system of communications, not a whole system by
themselves. People are also influenced by newspapers, books, and maga-
zines and by informal communications, all channels in which attacks can
be answered. Jaffe questions whether the risk of reducing discussion of
controversial issues should be balanced against the risk of "effectively
unanswered personal attacks if there is no required opportunity for
reply." 45
As to the rule's potential inhibitory effects, broadcasters who pro-
vide the most time to the discussion of controversial issues will be most
greatly affected. Since time is money to broadcasters, this rule could
militate against controversy on the air and for program blandness. This
"human nature" argument was discounted as "speculative" by the Court
in Red Lion, which stated that "if experience with administration of
these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather
than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time
enough to reconsider the constitutional implications." 46
Statutory Authority for the Fairness Doctrine
In upholding the F.C.C.'s relatively specific personal attack and edi-
torialization rules, the Supreme Court also sweepingly upheld the broad,
general fairness doctrine when it asserted:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Gov-
ernment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others
and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to
present those views and voices which are representative of his com-
munity and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from
the airwaves." 47
Surprisingly, Red Lion is the first case to challenge the statutory
authority of the F.C.C. to impose the fairness doctrine on broadcasters.
The Court held: "The fairness doctrine finds specific recognition in stat-
48 Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio
and Television Regulations, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 61, 141 (1967).
44 Blake, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 75.
45 Jaffe, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 553.
46 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., supra n. 2 at 393.
47 Id. at 389.
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utory form, is in part modeled on explicit statutory provisions relating
to political candidates, and is approvingly reflected in legislative his-
tory." 48 In 1959 Congress had amended Sec. 315 (a) of the Communica-
tions Act, requiring equal time for opposing candidates, to exempt from
equal time requirements certain appearances on news shows. Added to
Sec. 315 (a) was this sentence:
Nothing in the foregoing (amendments) shall be construed as re-
lieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of news-
casts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot cover-
age of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance.
49
Blake claims that the 1959 amendment "was specifically intended
only to prohibit unfair broadcast treatment of political candidates in the
types of (news) programs which were exempted from the equal time re-
quirement." ')o Barrow, too, concluded that "(a) more reasonable inter-
pretation of the legislative history" is that Congress, while not approving
all of the Commission's applications of the fairness doctrine, intended
that it should apply to the exempted newscasts.5 ' The Court, however,
agreed with the Commission's Fairness Primer pronouncement that the
fairness doctrine "as a basic delineation of a standard of public interest
in broadcasting was given specific Congressional approval in the 1959
amendment of Sec. 315 (a) of the Communications Act." 52
Fairness and the First Amendment
The fairness doctrine requires that when a radio or television station
broadcasts one viewpoint on a controversial issue of public importance,
it must affirmatively seek out and make reasonable offers of free broad-
cast time to spokesmen for contrasting viewpoints. It must be under-
stood that, as presently formulated, the fairness doctrine does not require
a broadcaster to devote equal time to contrasting views 53 and does not
demand that the station offer time to any particular person or group.
5 4
Further, it applies over a period of time.55
In his discussion of first amendment free speech problems and the
tests which courts have developed to solve them, Brennan pointed out
48 Id. at 380.
49 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (1964).
50 Blake, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 82.
51 Barrow, op. cit. supra n. 42 at 465.
52 Supra n. 8 at 10425.
53 Id. at para. 12.
54 Id. at para. 16.
55 Id. at para. 15.
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that only the "absolute" view of the first amendment flatly denies any
governmental power to regulate speech. The "redeeming social value"
test has been utilized in the obscenity cases; the "clear and present dan-
ger" test in regulation of subversive activities; the "balancing" test in
situations where regulations indirectly limit free speech. Under each of
these last tests government regulation of speech in particular contexts
has been upheld.56 In his classic attempt to build a general theory ap-
plicable to all first amendment speech cases, Emerson suggested "defini-
tional balancing," involving construction of conceptual definitions of the
key terms "freedom of expression," "abridge," and "law." The fairness
doctrine, in Emerson's view, illustrates an "affirmative measure to in-
crease the effective operation of the system" of freedom of expression on
which our society relies, to which type of first amendment problem the
courts should apply the definition of the word "abridge." 57 Having
placed the broadcaster in the dominant position, the government does not
abridge freedom of speech when it regulates the broadcaster in order to
assure against his abridgement of the freedom of expression of others.
That the first amendment is relevant to broadcasting has been set-
tled. 58 The broadcasters argued, however, that any regulation pertaining
to program control, such as the rules under discussion here and the fair-
ness doctrine in general, constitutes unconstitutional prior restraint or
governmental control of programming. Broadcasters would rather be
treated like the newspapers, content regulation of which is not consid-
ered to be constitutional. In their view, the first amendment principles
utilized in resolving New York Times Co. v. Sullivan59 to promote "un-
inhibited, robust, and wide open" debate on public matters are equally
appropriate to the speech media. Certainly both types of media have the
power to influence public decision making; both are impressed with pub-
lic interest.
In Red Lion the Court chose to rely on the scarcity of frequencies
and public ownership of the airwaves cliches to justify governmental
regulation. The fact that there are over 6,000 broadcasting stations but
only 1,700 daily newspapers did not sway the Court to accord unfettered
freedom of the press to broadcasters. 0 It also rang in the myth that any-
one can start a newspaper, while not everyone can broadcast (since a
license is needed). A more sensible rationale to justify the fairness doc-
trine and the rules promulgated under it is, in this writer's opinion, the
following:
56 Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
57 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877,
953 (1963).
58 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
59 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
60 Blake, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 87.
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Perhaps the most satisfactory distinction lies in the nature of the
two types of communications organs. Free competition in broad-
casting would probably result in the presentation of only the most
popular view and programs; newspapers, on the other hand, are sold
as a unit rather than by time. There is far less economic impetus for
publishers to maximize their audience for each page than there is
for broadcasters to maximize their audience for each time period.
Indeed, economic motivation might lead publishers to give space to
less popular topics, since those who are specially interested in these
areas will be encouraged to buy the entire publication. Thu.is minor-
ity interests and the general public interest in the free exchange of
information and ideas-protection of which underlie the first amend-
ment-are fostered by FCC regulation. To invalidate this scheme
of regulation in the name of the Constitution would undercut the
very protection the Constitution seeks to afford."'
At least a part of the problem faced by the Court in Red Lion is
attributable to the lack of a comprehensive broadcasting policy in this
country. The standard of "public convenience, interest, or necessity" is
vague as applied to the field of broadcasting, despite the Supreme Court's
assurance that this statutory standard is "as concrete as the complicated
factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit." 02
Unlike some administrative agencies which apply a public interest stand-
ard, in granting licenses for commercial radio and television stations the
F.C.C. almost never makes its decision based on whether or not there
is a need for broadcasting service. Instead, this agency decides who
should render it.
6 3
In Robinson's view the fairness doctrine is "predicated on examina-
tion, evaluation, and judgment of the Commission of specific program
content." 04 This is, he says, government control over program content
based on the F.C.C.'s standard of the public interest. To Kalven this
leads to "regulation by dossier." 65 Sullivan believes that while a public
interest standard may serve well from a "public utility point of view,"
this standard is not appropriate in determining the propriety of free ex-
pression."0 Although F.C.C. decisions indicate that the Commission will
give great weight to the licensee's judgment in fairness matters and will
impose sanctions "only where the facts of the particular case ... flagrant-
ly call for such action," 67 fairness determinations necessarily involve the
F.C.C. in the exercise of program surveillance.
61 Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701, 714 (1964).
62 F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
63 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of
Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1060 (1962).
64 Robinson, op. cit. supra n. 43 at 136.
65 Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J. Law and
Econ. 15, 21 (1967).
66 Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 719, 721 (1964).
67 Pacifica Foundation, 1 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 747, 752 (1964).
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Sullivan raises the further valid point that unless a communicator
has the duty to present information on significant issues, so that sanc-
tions can be applied when he has not done so, the practical problems cre-
ated by the fairness doctrine are likely to cause broadcasters to limit the
subjects they cover.6 s This precensorship frustrates the purpose of the
doctrine-an informed electorate.
By requiring under the fairness doctrine that a single broadcaster
must present all viewpoints of any controversial issue he airs, the F.C.C.
(and now the Supreme Court) assumes that the availability of diverse
viewpoints to the public cannot be left to the marketplace of ideas. Such
reasoning seems to overlook the fact that, at least as to radio, the listener
in a metropolitan area has a wide variety of stations from which to
choose. This fact, plus the F.C.C.'s ownership rule forbidding common
control of more than one AM and one FM station serving the same area,6 9
militate against the need for the fairness doctrine in all sections of the
country. The Supreme Court recognized no such distinction in its
opinion.
The most scathing criticism of the Court's opinion in Red Lion has
been voiced by Jonathan D. Blake. In his view the Court needlessly ex-
tended the program control powers of the F.C.C. and its decision was
based on fundamental definitional and historical errors. 70 The generally
accepted lay definition of fairness does not include the concept of pre-
senting both (or all) points of view on a controversial subject. This
country has no legal tradition of compelling one who takes a stand on
a controversial issue to tell all sides of the story. Granting that opinion
should be identified as such, one advocates his viewpoint on an issue
fairly when he does not "misrepresent the opposing viewpoint or does
not knowingly make false or reckless allegations of fact concerning the
issue." 71 If the F.C.C. were adjudging fairness based on this definition,
its decisions would not infringe on broadcasters' discretion over program-
ming except to prohibit grossly unfair conduct. Well established legal
principles of misrepresentation would be utilized instead of ill-defined
standards of fairness and balance.
According to Blake, early F.C.C. cases involving comparative pro-
ceedings in license grants and renewals stand not for the fairness prin-
ciple as now understood but for the concept that "licenses should not be
granted to private interest groups for their essentially private uses." 72
The early cases cited in the Court's opinion were based on the threat
of the 20's and 30's that scarce frequencies would be used to further busi-
ness and sectarian interests.
68 Sullivan, op. cit. supra n. 66 at 751.
69 47 C.F.R. § 73.35, 73.240 (1970).
70 Blake, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 76.
71 Id. at 77.
72 Id. at 79.
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Blake's main concern, like the broadcasters' argument before the
court in Red Lion, is with the inhibiting effect of the fairness doctrine. 73
The Supreme Court totally discounted the argument that the fairness
doctrine has inhibitory effects and that its uncertainty would inevitably
restrain the airing of controversial topics. One real problem is that of
defining a controversial issue. What are the responsible sides of the
issue? Who should be the spokesmen for the various viewpoints? No
standards which approach any degree of certainty have been established4. 1 _ *I ... a # ,
tu guue bruaucasters in these decisions.
Perhaps an example will serve to illustrate the broadcasters' dilem-
ma under the fairness doctrine as presently delineated. On May 5, 1970,
the voters of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, had before them a ballot issue per-
taining to the renewal of a county health and welfare levy. The subject
of welfare is controversial and the media should inform the electorate on
ballot issues. At least one station, WJW, decided to editorialize in favor
of the issue. Under the fairness doctrine, this editorial surely triggered
the licensee's obligation to present all sides of the question fairly. (Here,
it should be noted that the question is fairly simple, a "Yes" or "No"
vote. People can either be for the levy or against the levy. There is no
complicating in-between view.) Although not required by the fairness
doctrine, the station ended each editorial with an offer of reply time to
those with viewpoints different from the station's. No one came forward
and no organized opposition developed. The station did not seek out
a spokesman for the opposing point of view. The levy passed by a vote
of 191,802 to 123,545, proving that 40% of Cuyahoga County voters,
a substantial group by any test, disapproved of the levy. Emerson has
stated that the unorganized sectors need the protection of the law and
legal institutions in maintaining a system of free expression. 4 If it is the
right of listeners to hear all sides of a controversial question, and if it is
the affirmative duty of licensees to seek a representative spokesman, Sta-
tion WJW did not meet its fairness obligation. What such a conclusion
fails to take into account is that as a matter of practical politics, the very
designation of a spokesman against the levy by the station could have
had the effect of organizing opposition to such a levy. Thus, the station
would find itself involved in political organization, an effort which levy
opponents were not motivated to perform for themselves.
If it did not wish to designate a spokesman for the opposing point
of view, the station could have attempted to speculate for itself what the
40% of the voters would have said if they had wanted to be vocal. But
here again, this attempt to verbalize is a highly political act, one which
could have the effect of coalescing the opposition. In the situation here
described, the broadcaster has no facts on which to base his thesis. Re-
73 Id. at 82.
74 Emerson, op. cit. supra n. 57 at 901.
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quiring him to put together a "con" argument to balance his editorial
"pro" stand forces him to put words in peoples' mouths based on little
understood voter psychology.
Beyond Red Lion
To the extent that it encourages broadcasters to include the expres-
sion of minority opinion in their programming and discourages abusive
onesidedness, the fairness doctrine has, as Jaffe concluded, a "marginal
utility." 75 Good faith attempts by broadcasters to comply with the spirit
should work to the benefit of American society.
It is too soon to judge whether or not the Red Lion decision will
have any inhibitory effect either on general discussion of controversial
public issues or on overt broadcasting advocacy. Much depends on how
the F.C.C. handles fairness complaints. The F.C.C.'s recent opinion re-
garding complaints of news slanting on CBS's program "Hunger in
America" gives credence to the view that the F.C.C. recognizes first
amendment boundaries of its powers. This opinion stated, "We do not
consider it appropriate to enter the area where the charge is not based
upon extrinsic evidence but rather on a dispute as to the truth of the
event .... The Commission is not the national arbiter of the truth." 76
There may be times when the fairness doctrine will provide a measure
of protection to broadcasters from pressures from advertisers, govern-
ment officials, or other sources to express, or refrain from expressing,
particular views on the air.
Whether or not Red Lion provides a stepping stone to a first amend-
ment right of access to newspapers, as envisioned by Barron,77 remains
for the future.
In the opinion of this writer the spectre of monopoly ownership of
news media, though not stressed by the Supreme Court in Red Lion,
looms large in the background. Few will argue that our society should
guard against undue control over the political process and public opinion
by a limited few. The F.C.C. is presently considering proposed rules de-
signed to break up common control of television and daily newspapers,
based on research indicating that 94 television stations are affiliated with
newspapers in the same city. 78 Many observers have claimed that cen-
tralization of media ownership was leading to a closed system of com-
munications while our system of government requires an open system.
Emerson, accordingly, stated that in this area of public expression, there
must be developed legal principles "relating to the measure of govern-
75 Jaffe, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 556.
76 Memorandum Opinion, adopted October 15, 1969, 20 F.C.C. 2d 143, 150 (1969).
77 Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1641 (1967).
78 35 Fed. Reg. 5963, 5966 (1970).
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ment control over the content of the program. But little progress has
been made. The need is to formulate reasonably concrete standards,
based upon the underlying principles of public service and diversity.
Equally important, it is necessary to develop the institutions and tech-
niques for applying the standard and supervising that application." 70
Red Lion falls far short of such achievement.
From scrutiny of the criteria which the F.C.C. says it considers
when awarding broadcast licenses between competing applicants, Friend-
ly discerns two major public policies:
1. That the community should have the programs best adapted to its
needs.
2. That this goal should be achieved in a manner that will avoid un-
due concentration of the media of mass communications na-
tionally, regionally, and locally. 0
But neither the Commission nor the Congress nor the House and Senate
Committees responsible for broadcasting have ever clearly articulated
basic, broad policy goals for broadcasting. If the Court had had the
benefit of such goals its decision might have begun the setting of the
outer boundaries of F.C.C. control which, Kalven says, is requisite if
application of first amendment principles to broadcasting are to extend
beyond official lip service.8 '
In any event, the F.C.C.'s license renewal hearings are likely to be
more lively in the future, based on the cumulative effect of Red Lion and
the two United Church of Christ cases. The first8 2 granted listeners
standing to contest license renewals, and the second 3 admonished the
F.C.C. to give proper consideration to evidence presented by community
representatives of breaches of the fairness doctrine. Recently, Atlanta's
blacks used the license-renewal process to obtain promises from all 28
stations in that city to be more responsive to the needs of the black com-
munity through their programming.8 4 What was formerly a perfunctory
triennial ritual may soon be transformed into a time for bargaining be-
tween broadcasters and citizen groups seeking access to the airwaves.
A most notable "fairness" development occurred in Banzhaf v.
F.C.C.85 which upheld the F.C.C.'s ruling requiring radio and television
stations carrying cigarette advertising to also devote time informing their
79 Emerson, op. cit. supra n. 57 at 954.
80 Friendly, op. cit. supra n. 63 at 1060.
81 Kalven, op. cit. supra n. 65 at 37.
82 Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F. 2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
83 Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 38 U.S.L.W.
2002 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
84 Broadcasting Magazine, April 6, 1970, at 66.
85 405 F. 2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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audiences of the case against smoking. s8 Agreeing with the F.C.C.'s defi-
nition that smoking constituted a controversial issue, the Court of Ap-
peals said: "Whatever else it may mean, however, we think the public
interest indisputably includes the public health." 87 After its Red Lion
decision the Supreme Court denied certiorari to this Court of Appeals
decision. Thus, the content of commercials advertising products detri-
mental to the public health now comes within the purview of the fairness
doctrine.
Taking its cue from Banzhaf, at least one conservation group has
announced plans to prepare "anticommercials" designed to inform the
public of water pollution dangers from the phosphates contained in
household detergents.s8 Taking their cue from Red Lion's sweeping pro-
nouncement:
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, po-
litical, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is cru-
cial here.8 9
local broadcasters have said they will air them.
86 Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C. 2d 921
(1967).
87 Banzhaf v. F.C.C., supra n. 85 at 1096.
88 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 18, 1970, at 1.
89 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., supra n. 2 at 390.
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